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them for a different amount of time, 
it suggested that they distinguished 
them — preferring those stimuli 
which captured their attention longer. 
With this simple technique it was 
established that young infants have 
a preference for patterned over plain 
surfaces and especially for face-like 
stimuli.
Because not all perceptual 
discriminations are captured by a 
spontaneous preference for one of 
two simultaneously presented stimuli 
(visual preference method), looking-
time techniques were subsequently 
developed that capitalize on the 
fact that infants attend to what is 
new rather than familiar. Infants are 
repeatedly exposed to a stimulus until 
they lose interest and look away. In 
the test phase, they are then shown 
either the familiar stimulus or a novel 
one (habituation-dishabituation 
procedure). If infants show renewed 
interest towards the novel stimulus, it 
suggests that they recognize it as being 
different from the previous ones. In the 
‘violation-of-expectation paradigm’ 
infants are not familiarized with any 
material, but simply shown events that 
violate their pre-formed expectations 
about objects and events, which also 
leads to increased looking times. With 
these methods, even very young infants 
have been shown to discriminate 
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Until fairly recently, young infants 
were thought to be as cognitively 
incompetent as they were morally 
innocent. They were epistemological 
‘tabulae rasae’, helpless ‘bundles of 
reflexes’ who spent all of their time 
sleeping, crying and sucking. In the 
famous words of William James, 
infants lived in “one great blooming, 
buzzing confusion”.
This way of thinking was first 
challenged by the Swiss biologist 
and developmental psychologist 
Jean Piaget (1896–1980), who 
was among the first to explicitly 
characterize cognitive skills as 
biological adaptations. Piaget noted 
that babies’ manual explorations 
of their environment constituted a 
basic kind of knowledge, and that 
these sensory-motor skills created 
the foundation for mature cognition: 
the infant comes to ‘grasp’ the world 
epistemologically by initially grasping 
and manipulating actual physical 
objects. But though Piaget granted 
infants more competence than his 
predecessors, he was still, from 
a modern perspective, much too 
conservative and much too focused 
on action. In Piaget’s account, infants’ 
understanding should be entirely 
restricted to what they can sense 
and act on in the here and now. But it 
turns out that if we measure infants’ 
cognitive competencies in ways that 
are less demanding than grasping 
and manipulating objects (e.g., by 
monitoring their visual attention), they 
demonstrate fundamental knowledge 
of how the world works at much 
younger ages. 
Infants’ perception and 
understanding of the physical world
A fundamental prerequisite for 
understanding the physical world 
is the recognition of structures and 
patterns (Figure 1). In his classic 
experiments of the 1950s and 1960s, 
Robert Fantz demonstrated that 
even at two days of age infants can 
distinguish visual forms. He developed 
a technique in which babies 
were shown two different images 
simultaneously. If infants looked at 
Primer among various properties of stimuli such as color, shape and size.
Piaget thought that for infants 
anything ‘out of sight’ was also ‘out 
of mind’ — i.e., that an object ceased 
to exist once it is no longer visible. 
His critical test for whether infants 
possessed ‘object permanence’ was 
if they searched for an object by 
intentionally pulling away an occluder 
covering it. However, they acquire the 
ability to pull away the occluder only 
at around 8 months of age. Baillargeon 
and colleagues thus hypothesized 
that infants should be capable of 
showing ‘representational thought’ 
a lot younger if they did not have to 
demonstrate it through manual actions. 
In their famous ‘drawbridge study’, 
infants were familiarized to a screen 
rotating alternatingly from an upright 
to a flat position on a table. Following 
this familiarization phase, they saw a 
box being placed behind the screen, 
making it impossible for the screen 
to keep rotating all the way onto the 
table. During the test phase, they saw 
either a possible event — the screen 
stopped moving at the position where 
it would hit the box — or an impossible 
event — the screen rotated down onto 
the surface of the table. Infants looked 
reliably longer at the impossible than 
at the possible event. Contrary to 
Piaget’s claim, therefore, infants of only 
Figure 1. Cognitive testing in human infants.
An infant attending to a physical event in a looking-time experiment. Photo: Anne Henning, 
University of Saarbruecken.
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a few months of age (and before being 
capable of manual exploration) know 
that objects exist even when they are 
not being perceived.
A related question is how infants 
come to perceive visual objects 
as cohesive and separate entities. 
One obvious indicator to an object’s 
boundaries is isolated motion, i.e. if 
it changes position independently of 
other objects. In a pioneering study by 
Spelke and colleagues, 4-month-olds 
saw two short rods protruding from 
behind a rectangle, one from the top 
and one from the bottom (in a straight 
line). The two rods then either moved 
in synchrony in the same direction 
(appearing to move as one) or, in a 
control condition, did not move at 
all. As evidenced by different looking 
times, infants perceived the two 
moving rods as a single moving object, 
but they perceived the stationary rods 
as two separate objects.
Similar experiments establish that 
young infants have some rudimentary 
understanding of discrete quantities. In 
one study, 4.5-month-old infants were 
presented with two opaque screens 
with a gap between them. When 
two identical looking rubber ducks 
successively appeared from behind the 
screens without a duck ever traversing 
the gap between the screens, infants 
later expected two ducks behind the 
screens, not one. They thus seemed 
to understand the importance of 
continuous motion for object identity. 
Similar results were obtained in Wynn’s 
studies on numerosity: 5-month-old 
infants who witnessed a hand placing 
two objects behind an occluder one 
after the other later expected two 
objects (not one) to be located behind 
the screen. Infants thus track moving 
appearances in time and space and 
use this ability to isolate, identify, and 
even quantify objects.
Baillargeon extended these findings 
by investigating infants’ understanding 
of various kinds of physical events 
instantiating basic causal principles. 
She found that by around 4 months 
of age, infants expect, for example, 
non-supported objects to fall on 
the ground instead of sustaining 
themselves in mid-air (gravity), or 
fallen objects to land on top of other 
solid things instead of passing through 
them (solidity). In Leslie’s classic 
experiments it was found that 6-month-
olds know that physical causality 
depends on spatio-temporal contact. 
These and similar studies have shown 
that infants possess knowledge of 
such things as object coherence, 
solidity, contact (an object cannot exert 
force on another from a distance), the 
notion that two objects cannot occupy 
the same place at a given time, and 
that one object cannot simultaneously 
be in two different locations.
These findings have had a major 
impact on the conception of infant 
cognition. As Carey and Xu put it, 
“there is now ample evidence […] 
that infants as young as 2.5 months 
of age establish representations of 
individuated objects and track them 
through time, even when occluded”. 
In other words, rudimentary forms 
of an understanding of physics and 
number are in place from very early 
on in ontogeny, before much first-
hand experience (and no manipulative 
experience) has taken place. This has 
led to a renewed popularity of nativist 
positions such as that proposed 
by Spelke and Carey, according to 
which infants come into the world 
equipped with ‘core knowledge’ in the 
domains of space, objects, actions, 
and number. However, there is also 
still some skepticism of looking-time 
studies and resistance to drawing 
strong conclusions from them, as 
many factors may influence the length 
of time infants gaze at a display. 
Infants’ perception and 
understanding of the social world
Infants spend most of their time not 
individually exploring their physical 
environment but interacting with 
other agents. Scientists in recent 
years have thus also explored how 
infants understand their social 
world. In 1977, Meltzoff and Moore 
reported the astonishing finding that 
neonates, only a couple of days of 
age, mimic specific facial expressions 
that an adult displays towards them, 
such as mouth opening and tongue 
protrusion. Given that they could 
see the adult’s behavior but not 
their own (which they only sensed 
proprioceptively), this represents a 
case of intermodal integration. This 
was in itself surprising, but in many 
ways the most exciting aspects of this 
finding were its social implications: it 
suggested that infants had an innate 
understanding that other persons are 
‘like me’, which constitutes a critical 
basis for deeper intersubjective 
understanding later in life.
But newborns mimic only simple 
facial expressions, not actions that 
are directed towards external goals. 
Following the classic work of Gergely, 
Csibra, and colleagues, Woodward 
showed that infants as young as 5 
months of age understand that other 
people’s manual actions are directed 
towards specific goals. In these 
studies, infants were presented with 
a human hand reaching repeatedly 
for the same object, e.g., a ball, until 
they habituated. When the hand 
later reached for a new object, e.g., 
a teddy-bear, the infants showed 
renewed interest, even when the 
hand’s motion path and the object’s 
location were the same as before. 
They thus perceived the object as 
the new goal of the reaching hand. 
Interestingly, they did not react in 
this way when an inanimate object (a 
claw) grasped the target. When infants 
are given extra practice at reaching 
for and grasping objects themselves 
they perceive the reaching actions 
of others as goal-directed even at 3 
months of age — providing support 
at an older age for a similar ‘like me’ 
mechanism.
One characteristic of goal-directed 
actions, differentiating them from mere 
non-intentional movements, is that 
they can fail — the actual outcome 
does not match the intended one. 
18-month-olds make this distinction. 
Thus, in an imitation task in which a 
demonstrator failed to achieve her 
goal, infants reproduced her intended 
result, rather than just copying her 
behaviors. Likewise, infants selectively 
imitate actions that are verbally 
marked as intentional (‘There!’) but not 
those that are marked as accidental 
(‘Whoops!’). An even earlier sensitivity 
for the difference between intended 
and unintended acts has been found 
in 9-month-olds using a simpler 
response measure than imitation. 
When infants this age were confronted 
with an adult who seemed unwilling 
to give them an object they wanted, 
they responded with impatience and 
frustration, banging their hands on the 
table or turning away. The children sat 
much more patiently and waited when 
the adult seemed unable to pass them 
the desired object. 
In trying to discern what exactly a 
person is doing and why, infants even 
factor in the specific circumstances 
under which an adult behaves in 
a particular way. When an adult in 
Gergely and colleagues’ experiment 
turned on a light using her head, 
14-month-olds imitated this unusual 
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action when the adult’s hands were 
visibly free so that the use of the 
head seemed deliberately chosen 
and thus appeared to be essential 
to the action. However, when the 
adult’s hands were occupied, infants 
preferred to use their hands to turn 
on the light — presumably because 
they perceived the adult’s strange 
way of accomplishing this as forced 
upon her by the lack of a more 
convenient alternative. Infants seem 
to understand not just what someone 
is doing, but, in some circumstances, 
also why they are doing it.
Just as infants know what others 
do intentionally, they also know what 
others see. While even infants in 
the first six months of life turn in the 
general direction in which another 
person looks, their gaze-following 
becomes much more sophisticated 
and precise around their first birthday. 
Not only do they follow another’s 
line of view to hidden spaces, they 
also correctly refrain from following 
another’s head turn when the person’s 
eyes are closed, blindfolded, averted 
or when her vision is blocked by a 
barrier — indicating an awareness 
that open eyes and a clear line of 
sight are requirements for seeing. This 
behavior often marks the beginning 
of an episode of ‘joint attention’, in 
which infant and adult share an object 
of interest with the mutual awareness 
of it being shared — as evidenced 
by the ‘checking looks’ and ‘knowing 
smiles’ that infants display towards 
the adult. Other ways of initiating joint 
attention are shown by one-year-olds 
when they point out objects to others 
declaratively, show others objects 
by bringing them into the mutual line 
of sight or follow others’ pointing 
gestures.
The ability to engage in joint 
attention is foundational for the 
social-cognitive development of 
infants, including their language 
acquisition and later ‘theory of mind’. 
Engaging in joint attention with 
another person tunes infants in to 
what their partner ‘knows’. In a series 
of experiments involving an adult 
ambiguously requesting objects from 
infants, Moll and colleagues found 
that one-year-old infants were able to 
determine which of several objects 
an adult did or did not know from 
prior experience, independent of the 
child’s own experience with them. 
However, this ability of theirs was 
limited to situations of joint attention: 
only when the one-year-olds jointly 
attended to the objects that an adult 
became familiar with were they later 
able to distinguish between what 
was ‘old news’ versus ‘new news’ 
for the adult. Joint attention thus 
allows infants to come to understand 
others’ knowledge states. Habituation 
studies suggest that infants at this 
age may even distinguish true beliefs 
from false beliefs, and one interactive 
study suggests something similar. If 
infants understand false beliefs, this 
means that they have all of the basic 
elements of a representational theory 
of mind with which to predict what 
others will do not based on reality, but 
based on what those others believe 
about reality.
Finally, a recent frontier in the study 
of infant social cognition is their skills 
and motivations for cooperation. 
Warneken and Tomasello found that 
18- and 24-month-olds are able to 
cooperate with adults in various ways. 
When, as programmed, the adult 
stopped participating at a certain point 
during the activity, infants attempted 
to re-engage him, suggesting that 
they understood their joint activity 
as structured by an underlying joint 
goal, even joint commitment, to the 
cooperation. Infants of the same age 
also altruistically help others to achieve 
their individual goals. Infants in the 
second year of life were found to help 
an adult in various scenarios without 
any direct benefit for themselves; for 
instance, they spontaneously removed 
physical obstacles that hindered the 
adult, and showed him means that they 
knew were effective to bring about 
the intended result. One may think 
that infants must be trained in order 
to show such laudable behavior, but 
it has in fact been found that extrinsic 
rewards undermine rather than promote 
infants’ propensity to help. Moreover, 
Hamlin and coworkers showed that 
infants as young as 6 months of 
age prefer inanimate figures that 
they see as helpers over those they 
see as hinderers, and in habituation 
experiments even 3-month-olds 
Box 1.
Comparative cognition in primates.
Humans shared a common ancestor with other great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, 
gorillas, and orangutans) from around 6 to 15 million years ago. We should thus ex-
pect to see many cognitive skills in common among all great apes, including humans.  
A number of recent studies have demonstrated that this is indeed the case, but one 
study found an especially intriguing pattern of similarities and differences between 
human infants and two of their closest primate relatives: Herrmann and colleagues 
administered a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of chim-
panzees (n = 106) and orangutans (n = 32), and to 2.5-year-old human children  
(n = 105). The test battery consisted of 16 different nonverbal tasks assessing all 
kinds of cognitive skills involving both physical and social problems relevant to 
primates in their natural environment. The finding was that the children and apes had 
very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world; but the children — old 
enough to use some language but still years away from reading, counting, or going 
to school — already had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either ape species 
for dealing with the social world. Moreover, a factor analysis of individual differences 
showed that whereas the chimpanzees had only one factor covering various physical 
and social-cognitive tasks, the children showed distinct, separate factors for physical 
cognition and social cognition. These results suggest that at the end of the infancy 
period, children still have their general great-ape skills of physical cognition, but they 
already have species-unique skills of social cognition for collaborating, communicat-
ing, and learning from others in their cultural group.
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discriminate helpers from hinderers. 
These results clearly challenge the 
view that infants start out as egoists 
who have to be trained to become 
prosocial through systematic cultural 
intervention. Rather, they suggest that 
altruism and cooperation comes to 
humans naturally from the start. 
Evolution and human cognitive 
development
Interestingly, virtually all of the 
amazing skills that human infants 
show in understanding their physical 
world are also displayed by non-
human primates (Box 1). Some infants’ 
skills for understanding their social 
world are shared with other primates 
as well, but at the end of the infancy 
period, at around two years of age, 
while infants still have almost identical 
skills as their primate cousins in their 
understanding of objects, space, 
causality, and so forth, they are 
clearly unique in their social-cognitive 
skills for engaging in social learning, 
communication, and collaboration 
with others. These social-cognitive 
skills represent a species-unique 
kind of ‘cultural intelligence’ that 
enables human children to acquire 
the skills and knowledge of those 
around them, and so to amplify their 
cognitive skills manyfold. Humans’ 
most basic cognitive skills for 
understanding their physical and 
social worlds are thus clearly part of 
their evolutionary heritage, and the 
teaching, socialization, and language 
characteristic of human cultures then 
builds on this foundation to take 
human cognition to even greater 
heights.
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and its potential relevance to the 
evolution of animal multicellularity.
S. rosetta can exist as either single 
cells or rosette-shaped colonies that 
contain between four and ~50 cells 
arranged in closely packed spheres 
(Figure 1A). To determine how 
colonies form, cultures of solitary  
S. rosetta cells were induced to form 
colonies by co-cultivation with the 
prey bacterium Algoriphagus sp. and 
monitored for at least 12 hours by 
time-lapse microscopy (Supplemental 
Information). S. rosetta colonies 
were consistently observed to form 
through cell division and never 
by aggregation (Figure 1A). Cell 
division during colony formation was 
asynchronous, suggesting that the 
cell cycle is not coordinated between 
sister cells in colonies (Figure 1B).
Despite these observations, it 
is formally possible that S. rosetta 
colonies might form by aggregation 
at low frequency or under conditions 
that do not favor cell proliferation. In 
this case, colony formation through 
aggregation might be observed 
in cultures in which cell division is 
blocked. Therefore, we tested whether 
the cell cycle inhibitor, aphidicolin [10], 
can block cell proliferation and thus 
colony formation in S. rosetta. In the 
presence of aphidicolin, S. rosetta cells 
fail to divide, yet continue to increase 
in size and otherwise appear normal 
(Figure 1C). Upon removal of the drug, 
cell division resumes. To test whether 
colonies can form in the absence of cell 
division, S. rosetta cells were treated 
with either aphidicolin or DMSO (as a 
negative control) prior to induction of 
colony formation (Figure 1D). DMSO-
treated cultures developed colonies 
within 24 hours after induction, while 
cultures incubated with aphidicolin 
failed to form colonies, even after 
96 hours of induction. Removal of 
aphidicolin from induced cultures after 
36 hours of treatment permitted the 
development of colonies, demonstrating 
that the drug’s effect was reversible 
and that the formation of colonies is 
dependent upon cell proliferation. Taken 
together, these findings demonstrate 
that S. rosetta colonies form by cell 
division and not by cell aggregation. 
Our finding is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the last 
common ancestor of animals and 
choanoflagellates was capable 
of simple multicellularity. An 
important test of this hypothesis 
will be to determine whether colony 
Multicellular 
development in a 
choanoflagellate
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Little is known about how the first 
animals evolved from their single-
celled ancestors. Over 120 years ago, 
Ernst Haeckel proposed that animals 
evolved through “repeated self-
division of [a] primary cell,” [1] an idea 
supported by the observation that all 
animals develop from a single cell (the 
zygote) through successive rounds 
of cell division [2]. Nonetheless, there 
are multiple alternative hypotheses 
[3], including the formal possibility 
that multicellularity in the progenitor 
of animals occurred through cell 
aggregation, with embryogenesis 
by cell division being secondarily 
derived. The closest known relatives 
of animals, choanoflagellates, are 
emerging as a model system for 
testing specific hypotheses about 
animal origins [4–6]. Studying colony 
formation in choanoflagellates may 
provide a context for reconstructing 
the evolution of animal multicellularity. 
Here, we find that the transition from 
single cells to multicellular colonies 
in the choanoflagellate Salpingoeca 
rosetta  (previously known as 
Proterospongia sp.) occurs by cell 
division, with sister cells remaining 
stably attached. 
The life cycles of all 
choanoflagellates feature a prominent 
single-celled phase, but many species 
are also capable of forming colonies 
of morphologically similar cells [7–9]. 
Phylogenetics and the reconstruction 
of ancestral character states within 
the choanoflagellate group indicate 
that colony formation either evolved 
before the diversification of two of the 
three major choanoflagellate clades, or 
that it evolved independently multiple 
times [6]. It is also possible that the 
last common ancestor of animals 
and choanoflagellates was capable 
of forming multicellular colonies [6]. 
Thus, studies of the colony-forming 
choanoflagellate S. rosetta offer an 
opportunity to test hypotheses about 
the cell biology of colony formation 
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